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This paper concentrates on the role of the central bank in providing lender of last resort/emergency liquidity assistance (LOLR/ELA). Such role has expanded and acquired a new significance in the light of the turmoil in financial markets leading to remarkable changes in the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. The conventional wisdom about the extent and effectiveness of bank crisis management instruments is revisited and an assessment is made of the degree of government intervention needed to safeguard confidence in private financial markets. The paper restricts itself to issues of liquidity assistance and brings a legal perspective to some of the interesting issues surrounding this assistance. The paper focuses on the LOLR/ELA operations of the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England, since London and New York are the two major financial centres at the core of the crisis, though the role of the European Central Bank is also considered.  The question of the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency in the context of providing emergency liquidity assistance is discussed as is the controversial concept of constructive ambiguity.  Classic LOLR principles are also reviewed in the light of recent events, such as the policy on collateral, the charging of a penalty rate and lending over an extended period of time. The paper concludes by making a number of observations about where we are now and what needs to be done for the future. 

Introduction
Banking crises are a regular occurrence in international finance and during the last thirty years have taken place in over 100 countries​[1]​. As a result of this most countries have put in place a financial sector safety net which comprises a mix of the following: a supervisory and regulatory framework; a deposit protection system, bank insolvency laws​[2]​ and a lender of last resort role by the central bank.   There are also government measures of implicit protection of depositors, the payment system, and the financial system at large. This article concentrates on the lender of last resort role of the central bank (LOLR) and on the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) operations available to central banks.  The term ‘lender of last resort’ evokes collateralized lines of lending, while emergency liquidity assistance encompasses a broader array of operations, as we further discuss below. LOLR/ELA operations have acquired a new significance in the light of the turmoil in financial markets over the last months, leading to remarkable changes in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.  Two UK banks, Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, have been nationalised, Alliance & Leicester has been taken over by Santander (via Abbey, its UK subsidiary)  and a significant recapitalisation programme has been introduced which has led to the government having substantial ownership stakes in Royal Bank Of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS).
In the United States, the hastily arranged take-overs of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan in March 2008 and of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America in September 2008, the ‘bailout’ of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the demise of Lehman Brothers and the rescue package for Citigroup (to cite a few of the most relevant developments) suggest the need to revisit the conventional wisdom about the extent and effectiveness of bank crisis management instruments and to re-assess what degree of government intervention is needed to safeguard confidence in private financial markets.  
The inter-bank liquidity crisis, which arrived seemingly unexpectedly in August 2007 and with a rapidity which took the financial sector by surprise, provides the starting point of our discussion.​[3]​  From a legal perspective, LOLR/ELA policies raise a number of interesting issues, which we consider in our analysis. 
Legislative changes have taken place or have been proposed on both sides of the Atlantic and a lot of soul searching is happening in the EU, in the UK, in the US (and in many other countries) as regards the institutional design of supervision and crisis management. LOLR sits squarely in that debate. This article focuses particularly on the two major financial centres at the core of the crisis, London and New York, which have followed very different approaches and had significantly different legal frameworks in which to operate.  Global crises - it has been stated - require global solutions. And yet, crisis management procedures (LOLR, deposit insurance, insolvency proceedings) are for the most part nationally based. A partial exception concerns the role of the European Central Bank, which is briefly considered in this article.
In the United Kingdom, the Banking Bill, which had been introduced into Parliament in October 2008, received Royal Assent on 12 February 2009 and is now an Act of Parliament.​[4]​ The Banking Act 2009 gives a statutory mandate with regard to financial stability to the Bank of England and introduces a bank resolution and insolvency framework. However, the legal framework for the provision of emergency liquidity assistance and the role of the Bank of England as lender of last resort are only partially considered​[5]​ in the Act and this is something to which we will return later in this article. The important notion of ‘financial stability’ is not defined in the new Banking Act (nor was it defined in any of the consultation documents) even though it is the key objective, a fundamental concept in the reform process that is at the core of the LOLR/ELA policies of the central bank.  The Banking Act introduces a Special Resolution Regime for banks and a new bank insolvency framework.  Though the legislative reform was initially triggered by the Northern Rock crisis, subsequent events emphasised the relevance of the reform process and the need to grant the authorities a sufficient array of tools to confront a troubled bank.
The serious financial difficulties experienced by Northern Rock bank brought the issue of the safety of banks and the protection of depositors to the attention of the public in the UK. Despite having in place a financial sector safety net which included the provision of emergency liquidity assistance and a depositor compensation scheme, Northern Rock suffered a humiliating old-fashioned bank run, much to the embarrassment of the UK Government, the FSA and the Bank of England​[6]​. 
In the United States, the episodes of Bear Stearns, AIG, and other major financial institutions where rescue packages were put in place, have triggered a flurry of initiatives by the Federal Reserve Board (further elaborated below), as well as legislative and regulatory responses.  The increasing involvement of the US Treasury in recent months (commitment of taxpayers’ money) has raised the stakes of the debate about what needs to be done, with some calls for nationalization of some banks.  Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 2008, Congress authorized the Secretary of the treasury to purchase up to $700 billion of troubled assets of financial institutions under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). EESA also increased Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage from $100,000 to $250,000. In February 2009, the new Secretary Treasury, Tim Geithner, announced the new Financial Stability Plan, restructuring the TARP. A legislative  amendment to establish a receivership and liquidation process for systemically significant non-bank troubled financial institutions similar to the system for banks is likely in the near future.
The ways in which the authorities in these countries have approached the question of providing emergency liquidity assistance demonstrates a number of differences which are worthy of investigation and analysis. 
Market liquidity, individual assistance and other definitional issues
Our initial consideration is that central banks provide liquidity, not capital.   Though the crisis has moved beyond the liquidity squeeze phase some time ago, and concerns about liquidity have mutated into concerns about solvency, the provision of central bank liquidity remains a key instrument to confront the crisis. The ingenious expansion and imaginative interpretation of central bank powers, such as Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act in the US, to provide a wider range of facilities to market participants is one of the defining policy responses of the last eighteen months.  
There are two main types of crisis situations where the provision of emergency liquidity assistance could be critical. The first is the case of a general, in many if not all financial markets, liquidity dry up (of which we have ample examples in the last eighteen months) leading to a widespread and generalized  questioning of the liquidity of different sorts of financial institutions. Open market operations is the classic instrument in this type of crisis.
The second, the classic case of LOLR assistance (elaborated by Thornton and Bagehot, as further explained below), refers to collateralised loans to an illiquid banking sector. A particular crisis situation can arise, for example, when one or more financial institutions gets into trouble due to problems which originate in the payment system and that can lead to a payment system gridlock.

The confines of our subject appear like a moving target as events have unfolded, and other crisis management mechanisms have often overlapped with liquidity assistance operations.  Various forms of government intervention have triggered a debate on whether banking in future should be treated as a utility, that is, as an essential public service. The wisdom of having the government as insurer of last resort is also being questioned.  While we will be referring briefly to some of these forms of government support, our analysis remains anchored in central bank liquidity operations. 
Another definitional issue where the contours are becoming less clear concerns the distinction in times of crises between regular discount policies (a classic instrument of monetary policy) and extraordinary or emergency lending.​[7]​  LOLR is an instrument that affects monetary and financial stability. The extent to which ELA/LOLR is a sub-function of monetary policy has been debated in the ECB context, as explained below. The distinction between ordinary monetary policy and extraordinary liquidity assistance gets further complicated when we consider the ‘non-standard monetary policy operations’ undertaken by central banks in recent months. For example, the ‘quantitative easing’ announced by the Bank of England to expand sharply the money supply, now that interest rates cannot go much lower; the announcement by the Bank of a programme of asset purchases of 75 billion sterling pounds, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves means that monetary policy has taken a turn into the unknown.​[8]​ Hugely expanded operations by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve System​[9]​ to provide liquidity into the banking system as a response to the crisis are also an indication of the difficulties in delineating what constitutes monetary policy operations and what constitutes ELA/LOLR in a crisis. From a legal point of view, if a central bank is both in charge of monetary policy and LOLR, as the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England are, this is not a problematic issue.  The situation is different though with regard to the ECB. It has a clear mandate to conduct monetary policy according to Article 105.2 of the EC Treaty and Article 18 of the ESCB Statute. However, with regard to LOLR operations, the ESCB adopted a restrictive reading of the ECB competences, concluding in 1998 that LOLR/ELA was a national task of the National Central Banks (NCBs), in line with Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute (a provision which allows NCBs to perform non-ESCB tasks on their own responsibility and liability).​[10]​ Though this interpretation is contested by some authors, such as René Smits,​[11]​ and though it is clouded with a degree of uncertainty, it is the line the ECB has advocated so far.​[12]​ 
The ECB and NCBs must also comply with the prohibition of Article 101 EC Treaty regarding the monetary financing of governments.​[13]​ This prohibition and the ‘no bail out’ of governments clause of Article 103 of the EC Treaty have had important repercussions in the management of the current financial and economic crisis.​[14]​
Another definitional issue refers to the line between illiquidity and insolvency, which is a fluid and dynamic one, as we discuss below.  Finally, the issues surrounding the EC rules on competition and state aid to the banking sector and the prolific application of state aid to banks in many EU Member States add another layer of complexity to what is already a challenging subject.
Bearing in mind these difficult definitional issues and the fact that we are dealing with a moving target, we try in this paper to confine our analysis to the liquidity assistance that central banks provide in extraordinary circumstances, such as the ones financial markets, and the economy at large, have lived over the last eighteen months. 
The Background to the Liquidity Crisis
During the summer of 2007 liquidity started to significantly dry up in many markets, including New York and London, the two major inter-bank markets. The speed with which liquidity disappeared was quite unexpected and the extent and severity of the difficulties were unforeseen, although a number of institutions and commentators had previously demonstrated concerns about a number of practices in the financial markets​[15]​.
From a UK perspective the recent crisis has exposed a number of problem areas and deficiencies in the UK financial sector safety net.  This crisis has provided the first test of the safety net which had been introduced by the new Labour government after its election in 1997.  In a number of respects this has been found wanting.  As noted above the crisis has led to the nationalisation of banks, a series of consultations and proposed new legislation. A new landscape for financial sector regulation is being developed and the role to be played by the Bank of England as lender of last resort needs to be addressed.  This article inter alia seeks to examine the existing role of the Bank of England and how the new proposals would affect it.
From a US perspective, the multiplicity of regulatory authorities at the state and federal level, and the important role played by the Federal Reserve System​[16]​ , by the Securities and Exchange Commission (whose role was found to be wanting in several well publicised cases, such as the Madoff fraud) and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, have triggered a debate and a call for reform, which is also supposedly a priority in the Obama administration.  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) provided for the creation of the Congressional Oversight Panel, which produced a special report on 29 January 2009​[17]​ entitled: “Modernizing the American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting Consumers and Ensuring Stability”.  This report calls for a systemic risk authority, stating that a new or existing agency or interagency task force should regulate systemic risk within the financial system on an ongoing basis. Chairman Bernanke has said that “effectively identifying and addressing systemic risks would seem to require the involvement of the Federal Reserve in some capacity, even if not in the lead role”.​[18]​
Liquidity and the Central Bank
During the last eighteen months extensive liquidity support from central banks has been necessary in many countries but the approach to this is not something about which there is an international norm with approaches varying considerably from country to country. 
Liquidity support is normally only available to banks and not other types of business.​[19]​ However, this conventional wisdom has been tested in recent months, with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York extending liquidity to investment banks (Bear Stearns and others) and to insurance companies (AIG), in accordance with Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act. It is necessary to have a source of liquidity available to try to ensure the stability of the financial system as the structure of banks and the ways in which they operate make them particularly vulnerable.
Banks have traditionally raised most of their funds from depositors and used this money to lend to borrowers. This creates some potential liquidity problems in that the funds deposited will normally be available on demand or with a relatively short notice period whereas loans​[20]​ are generally made for a fixed period. This is usually referred to as “borrow short – lend long”. As a result of this should there be unusually high demand by depositors to withdraw savings the bank will face a squeeze on liquidity. In such a situation, provided the bank’s balance sheet is in good shape, it will normally turn to the inter-bank market for assistance and if that is not available then to the central bank. 
In the past few years the position has changed somewhat with many banks, rather than relying on deposits to fund lending, turning to the money markets to borrow large sums for fixed periods and also using securitisation  of loan portfolios. This, as has been demonstrated in the last eighteen months, significantly increased liquidity risks. As a result of such developments there is a need to discuss, from the legal perspective, the scope and parameters of what has traditionally been referred to as ‘lender of last resort’, a function undertaken by central banks​[21]​.
Two Important Features of Lender of Last Resort Financing 
Before considering the history and theory of the lender of last resort function there are two particularly important features of emergency liquidity assistance which make it such a valuable tool in the prevention and control of banking crises, and which need to be considered. The first is the immediacy of the availability of central bank assistance (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.  This is a key feature that distinguishes lender of last resort from other support operations and crisis management procedures. This ‘immediacy’ contrasts with the ‘time framework’ of other crisis management instruments. The second important feature is the unlimited capacity of the central bank to provide liquidity, either to the market in general or to individual banks as needed.  
By being able to act quickly and to provide adequate liquidity it should be possible in a well regulated financial environment to prevent liquidity problems from developing into serious financial crises. Neither deposit insurance nor bank insolvency proceedings can achieve this.  By their very nature they are lengthy and complicated processes which take into account the interests of many stakeholders and are subject to legal constraints.  They are both necessary and valuable but cannot provide immediate assistance to prevent a crisis worsening.  In most countries the central bank will undertake the role of providing lender of last resort assistance but this can be more complicated in certain situations.  For example the position of the European Central Bank within the European System of Central Banks is somewhat awkward, since it can provide some forms of ELA but not others (classic collateralized lines to individual institutions, which remain the responsibility of the national central banks, at their own cost, but with the fiat of the ECB).  
Lender of Last Resort – the history and theory​[22]​
The historical and theoretical basis of lender of last resort assistance was originally developed by Henry Thornton​[23]​ in the early part of the 19th century and then by Walter Bagehot some 70 years later​[24]​. Both of these authors used the term ‘lender of last resort’ in their writings and this is still widely used at the present time.  Other terms such as ‘emergency liquidity assistance’ and ‘emergency liquidity financing’ are also used.  Since it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain what constitutes LOLR,​[25]​ it is useful to go back to the origins of the doctrine first and to establish then how much we have departed from that traditional doctrine (or from ‘good practice’).
The essence of the theoretical basis is that there are four ‘pillars’, or conditions, that are to be applied when providing lender of last resort assistance. These are not legal principles, but rather principles attributed to LOLR since the doctrinal elaboration by Thornton and Bagehot. First, financial assistance should be made available to banks which are illiquid but solvent​[26]​ to stem a crisis which could lead to the failure of a bank or banks. Second, the central bank should lend ‘freely’, that is it should lend as much as is needed, but the rate of interest charged should be high.  This is frequently referred to as a penalty rate in the literature but there is some disagreement about this​[27]​. So what did Bagehot actually say?  He said that these loans should only be made at “a very high rate of interest” and went on to say that “this will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it”.​[28]​  It was clearly the intention of Bagehot that the availability of this sort of financing was to be at a price significantly greater than that being charged by other lenders to ensure that recourse to such assistance would only be made after all other avenues had been tried.  The third pillar is that the central bank should accommodate anyone who can provide ‘good’ collateral which is valued at lower than pre-panic prices but higher than it would have been valued had the central bank not entered the market. The issue of what amounts to appropriate collateral is discussed further below.  Fourth, while the central bank should let it be known in advance that it will be ready to lend it will also exercise discretion in whether or not to provide assistance​[29]​. This is sometimes referred to as “constructive ambiguity” although as will become apparent neither author agrees that this is a constructive feature and indeed we believe that more often than not ‘destructive’ would be a more appropriate term to use; hence our preference for the word ‘discretion’: the central bank's LOLR role is discretionary, not mandatory. The assumed benefits of ‘constructive ambiguity’ do not actually exist. Ambiguity and uncertainty as to the procedures and loci of power are not constructive. In the event of a crisis, the procedures to follow should be crystal clear ex ante for the institution affected, other market participants and the public at large The only ‘ambiguity’ that can be constructive in LOLR is the discretionary component in the provision of such assistance, in the sense that there is no obligation for the central bank to provide LOLR loans.  It is this discretionary nature that reduces the moral hazard incentives inherent in any support operation, together with the fact that once an institution’s collateral has run out it gets no further assistance. Bagehot and Thornton contended that the LOLR's responsibility is to the market, to the entire financial system and not to specific institutions.
Freixas et al​[30]​ provide the following description of the use of lender of last resort  in modern times: “the discretionary provision of liquidity to a financial institution (or the market as a whole) by the central bank in reaction to an adverse shock which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity which cannot be met from an alternative source”. 
Prior to the international financial crisis modern-day practice in many countries, if not most, was still largely based on these four pillars. Bagehot, it should be noted, was clearly of the opinion that an insolvent bank which could not provide good security should not receive assistance and should be allowed to fail​[31]​. A widespread reluctance to allow banks to fail, even when clearly insolvent, has been demonstrated in many countries in the recent past.
It would appear that the discretionary nature of the lender of last resort is perhaps the most important and controversial aspect.  The central bank will assess whether what it faces it is a situation of illiquidity or insolvency and will also consider whether the failure of the institution involved would be likely to trigger contagion within the marketplace bringing with it the danger of the failure of other institutions.​[32]​ The discretionary aspect is intended to assist in preventing the increase in moral hazard which would exist should the central bank be obliged to lend in all cases.  We would argue however that the risk to contagion posed by a refusal to assist an insolvent bank must be weighed against the effect on moral hazard that a bailout would create. The central bank, before exercising its discretion to act or not to act as LOLR, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the results of its intervention (this is, of course, a difficult exercise, since it is done under pressure and with the need to reach a decision as promptly as possible). The costs are typically the risk of loss to the central bank and the creation of moral hazard incentives.  The benefits accrue from the speed, flexibility and decisiveness with which the central bank can cope with an emergency crisis. In this cost-benefit analysis due consideration should be given to the interests of depositors, other creditors, shareholders and taxpayers. A generalized banking crisis is different from an individual banking crisis in a healthy economy, an important element that the central bank will also consider.  The central bank should be held accountable for the use of its discretionary LOLR powers.  Such accountability needs to be articulated carefully, particularly in cases where the central bank has no direct role in bank supervision; due consideration should also be given to the degree of central bank independence from the Treasury or Minister of Finance with regard to the exercise of the LOLR function.
Revisiting LOLR: a moving target
Lending to insolvent institutions is a departure from the classical LOLR principles. The risk of loss to the central bank is ultimately a risk of loss to the public (taxpayers). However, in practice, and this is particularly acute in times of crises, it is often hard to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency. A situation of bank illiquidity (i.e., lack of liquid funds) can be an indication of technical insolvency (i.e., value of liabilities exceeds market value of assets) or can quickly turn into insolvency if assets are sold at a loss value or “fire-sale” price. And an insolvent institution, if allowed to continue operations, will almost certainly run into liquidity problems. The immediacy of the need for assistance often makes it difficult to assess at the moment whether the institution is illiquid or insolvent. If central banks provide inadequately collateralised support to insolvent rather than illiquid institutions, the traditional short-term nature of the LOLR assistance is likely to be insufficient to solve the troubles of such institutions.   Therefore, in practice, the LOLR will be the first step in a chain or process that is likely to include a bank insolvency proceeding.
In the EU there is also a need to comply with state aid rules. Because an inherent subsidy exists whenever the central bank lends to an insolvent institution, under the EC rules on state aid, the granting of aid to banking institutions could be considered illegal in some cases. The proliferation of state aid cases to banks in various EU Member States in recent months suggests the need to tread carefully in this area​[33]​; ‘rescue aid’ must be temporary and reversible and must not be given for a duration exceeding six months, unless it is converted into ‘restructuring aid’ through the submission of a ‘restructuring plan’. ​[34]​ The European Court of Justice recognized on a ground-breaking decision, the Züchner case, that EC competition rules are also applicable to the banking sector.​[35]​ The state aid policy of the EC, founded in Articles 92-94 of the EC Treaty, runs parallel to the antitrust or competition policy based on Articles 85-87 of the EC Treaty.  The state aid policy is built upon the general premise that aid granted by a Member State which distorts competition or affects trade is incompatible with the common market, and is thus prohibited. The granting of ‘illegal aid’ may confer an unfair economic advantage to a recipient undertaking, discriminating against those undertakings which do comply with the rules.  State aid will only be compatible with the common market if it has been notified to and cleared by the Commission. On 5 December 2007 the EU Commission in its approval of the rescue aid package for Northern Rock significantly concluded​[36]​ ‘that the emergency liquidity assistance provided by the Bank of England on 14th September 2007, which was secured by sufficient collateral and was interest-bearing, did not constitute state aid’. The Commission Communication of 13 October 2008 further reiterates this point.​[37]​ In establishing a single market in financial services, it is important that the Treaty’s state aid rules are applied consistently and equally to the banking sector, though with a regard to the peculiarities and sensitivities of the financial markets. 
Another spin-off regarding the differentiation between illiquidity and insolvency refers to the multiple problems and difficulties experienced in the valuation of various assets (a feature of the financial crisis 2007-2009), which present a very serious information problem. Concerns about liquidity can be uncertainty about insolvency. 

Lending over an extended period of time (which is often an indication that the problems are not of mere illiquidity) increases the risk of loss to the central bank, risk of loss to the public. Any extended lending – committing taxpayers’ money – should ideally be done by the fiscal authority. To minimise the risk of moral hazard, it is important to demarcate clearly what the central bank can do and what the central bank cannot do - or should not do - through its LOLR.  The central bank can provide emergency liquidity - quick cash upfront - over a short period of time, when no other sources of funding are readily available.  What the central bank should not do is to lend over an extended period of time, committing taxpayers’ money, without the explicit approval of the fiscal authority. The central bank can provide liquidity not capital. Any extended lending becomes the responsibility of the fiscal authority.   Neither should the central bank use its LOLR to bail out bank owners; the LOLR’s ultimate responsibility remains to the market, to the entire financial sector and not to any particular institution. 
A punitive rate or a high rate of interest has typically been considered a tenet of classic LOLR operations. However, several authors have suggested a rate lower than the market rate.​[38]​ Goodhart argues that the cost of the initial [borrowing] tranche should be kept very low to avoid the stigma problem associated with borrowing from the central bank.​[39]​ The expansion of central bank liquidity operations have turned what ought to be extraordinary into ‘ordinary’, ordinary in the sense that with the crisis the central bank has often been the lender of primary or only resort. The central bank’s commitment to fight the crisis has signified a departure from this otherwise typically applied principle. Rather than discourage its use, the central bank has been keen to encourage various types of lending operations, whatever qualification one wishes to attribute to them: ordinary or extraordinary. With the drying up of the inter-bank market, the central bank has often been the only provider of liquidity to the money markets. It is worth noting that it is possible for the interest rate to be high, while lower than it would have been without central bank lending.

One of the four pillars of traditional lender of last resort practice is that the institution receiving assistance should provide ‘good’ collateral​[40]​.   How exactly this has been applied has varied from country to country and crisis to crisis.  In some instances collateral has not been provided at all while in others only the best quality collateral has been considered to be acceptable, for example, treasury bonds. As speed is invariably of the essence when a request for emergency liquidity assistance is received it will often be difficult to accurately assess the value of any collateral that is being offered or the suitability of the type of asset.  For example, the various types of collateralised debt obligations which have been developing in the recent past range from those which are backed by top quality loans to others which may relate to the sub-prime mortgage market.​[41]​
The recent financial crisis has exposed a significant weakness of the securitisation process.  Individual banks started to refuse to accept securitised loan obligations for a number of reasons.  In some instances there has been doubt about the quality of the underlying assets thereby suggesting that the bonds may be worth significantly less than face value.  On the other hand in many cases where good-quality assets have been securitised and such bonds should, in normal market conditions, be easily tradable on the financial markets.  However, as the liquidity crisis developed it became clear that even those securitised obligations of supposedly high-quality had become virtually impossible to use as trust between banks evaporated.
The Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) developed by the Bank of England recognized the need for banks holding such assets to be able to raise liquidity against them.  The SLS is not a replacement for the Bank of England’s lender of last resort policy.  However, it does raise the issue of what sort of collateral should be acceptable to the Bank when undertaking its role as lender of last resort.  If it is acceptable under the SLS to use collateral of good quality, but which is not in the form of government issued securities, it is arguable that this should be allowed to continue.
The question of what, if any, collateral should be taken by the Bank of England when exercising its lender of last resort function is not currently set out anywhere in law and traditionally it has been left to the Governor and Court of the Bank to decide policy on this.  It is suggested that it would be better practice to have legislative provisions which set out clearly what types of collateral will be acceptable and on what terms (for example what haircut should apply).
The policy on collateral needs to be addressed and an approach formulated to ensure that  all banks operating in a particular market are fully aware of  what will be acceptable to the central bank and, equally important, what will not.  In most jurisdictions the position appears to be unclear and this is a situation which can only assist in exacerbating  a difficult situation. Weak collateral runs against the essence of the credibility that central bank LOLR/ELA operations are meant to achieve.
It is worth returning to the words of Walter Bagehot who wrote ‘…The object is to stay alarm, and nothing therefore should be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good security to offer. The news of this will spread in an instant through all the money market at a moment of terror…’.​[42]​ He went on to say ‘…principle requires that such advances, if made at all for the purpose of curing panic, should be made in the manner most likely to cure that panic. And for this purpose, they should be made on everything which in common times is good ‘banking security’. ​[43]​  
The Financial Sector Safety Net in the UK and the Financial Crisis from Northern Rock onwards
The structure of the regulation of financial services in the UK underwent a significant reform in 1997 which led to the passing of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA)  and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority.  This new financial landscape brought about many reforms which at the time were generally considered to be very positive, with particular praise for the move to give independence to the Bank of England. Although the Bank of England was no longer to be the banking regulator, this role was to be undertaken by the FSA, it retained its traditional role of lender of last resort.
Although the reforms were significant and led to both a substantial piece of legislation, which in turn has led to an extremely detailed rule book which has been designed and implemented by the FSA, no statutory, or indeed other, guidance is given as to how the Bank of England is to undertake its lender of last resort role. From 1997 until the late summer of 2007 this had not been an issue which received much attention but the drying up of liquidity on the inter-bank markets, initially in New York and subsequently in London, created a number of problems. However, in the late summer of 2007 the focus in the UK turned to one bank, Northern Rock, which had been a former building society which had become a fast-growing mortgage bank.
As mentioned above, this article restricts itself to ELA/LOLR and does not consider other aspects such as the lack of an appropriate bank insolvency law or possible failures in supervision/regulation.
The Northern Rock Story​[44]​
Northern Rock Bank, a former conservatively run building society based in the city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north of England, became a household name in September 2007. Despite the scale of the events which followed it is important to realize that Northern Rock was not, in our opinion, a systemically important bank​[45]​, it was a mortgage bank with no significant cross-border operations​[46]​. 
Traditionally Northern Rock funded its mortgage lending solely from deposits from customers and it operated a very conservative lending policy. In the mid-1980s new legislation permitted building societies in the UK to become banks and Northern Rock took advantage of this and became a bank.  By 2006 Northern Rock had become the UK’s fifth largest mortgage lender. It had moved away considerably from its original business model of funding lending predominantly from deposits only about 25% came from depositors. Northern Rock raised money directly in the money markets and had also securitized a large percentage of its loan portfolio and sold this to investors.  
Profits were increasing rapidly and the share price was booming and in January 2007 a 23% increase in lending was announced. Profits (pre-tax) were up 16.5% and the dividend was increased by 20%. All appeared to the outside world to be very well and the CEO claimed the balance sheet as being “low risk”. A further announcement in April 2007 showed that lending had increased by close on 50% over the previous year. Some criticisms were being voiced by outsiders about potentially reckless behaviour but no action was taken by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)​[47]​. 
During the summer months of 2007 a lack of liquidity appeared to be developing in a number of markets. Hedge fund problems developed. In late July, despite having issued a warning about reduced profits the CEO announced that Northern Rock would continue to increase its lending. On the 9th of August the inter-bank markets and other financial markets, in the major financial centres ‘froze’ and liquidity more or less dried up completely. As a result of this during that August the Bank of England received approaches from banks requesting additional liquidity at no penalty rate​[48]​. The Governor of the Bank of England was not willing to assist in this way and gave three reasons. First, he was of the opinion that the banking system as a whole was sufficiently strong to “withstand the impact of taking onto the balance sheets the assets of conduits and other vehicles”.   He was also of the opinion that the problems were temporary in nature and that “the private sector will gradually re-establish valuations of most asset backed securities, thus allowing liquidity in those markets to build up”. His final point was that there would be a risk of moral hazard​[49]​.  
On August 10th Northern Rock informed the FSA of its impending liquidity difficulties and that it was going to need almost $3 billion almost immediately, but was unable to obtain this in the money markets. The Governor of the Bank of England was informed of the situation on August 14th. Two days later the Northern Rock chairman discussed the possibility of a financial support operation​[50]​. Nothing came of this and it was not until September 3rd that a Tripartite Committee consisting of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chairman of the FSA met to discuss the deteriorating situation at Northern Rock​[51]​. The Tripartite Committee had, it seems, since the middle of August, been considering three options. First, for Northern Rock to resolve its own problems. This was not feasible in the market conditions which existed at that time. Second, was a possible takeover by a major retail bank. Third, consideration was given to a liquidity support facility for Northern Rock by the central bank, the Bank of England, which would be guaranteed by the government.
It is now known that by early September Northern Rock urgently needed emergency liquidity financing and on 29th August the Chair of the FSA had written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to indicate that Northern Rock was “running into quite substantial problems”​[52]​. A decision was finally taken by the Governor of the Bank of England to make emergency liquidity assistance available to Northern Rock and this was ‘leaked’ and reported by the BBC on 13th September a day before the formal announcement was to be made​[53]​. The fact that Northern Rock was receiving financial support sparked public panic and the run on the bank began in earnest. This was the first run on a British bank in over a century​[54]​ and despite public assurances by the Chancellor the queues kept increasing. This was all being shown live on television with depositors in line being interviewed. Not surprisingly this made things worse and by the Saturday morning a full-blown bank run was underway but, surprisingly, it had not spread to any other bank or building society.
The events of the following Monday, 17th September, were dramatic. Breakfast television was broadcasting live pictures of the lengthy lines at some Northern Rock branches. The bank run had become the main news item on all UK TV channels.
Many of Northern Rock’s depositors were not being reassured by the Chancellor’s statements or those being made by the FSA, the Bank of England or Northern Rock itself. The public relations campaign throughout the weekend had not worked. The weekend media news coverage had increased speculation about problems. 
The Chancellor, apparently after discussions with the Prime Minister and the other relevant parties, announced that all deposits at Northern Rock would be protected. Of particular importance was that the protection would also cover other banks. It was only limited by the use of the phrase “during the current crisis”. The government had written a blank cheque for all the deposits in the UK banking system​[55]​.
The announcement was made on the Monday afternoon and this meant that all the TV channels had it as their main news item that evening. By Tuesday morning the run had ended. The immediate panic was over but many of the problems had not gone away. On Wednesday the 19th the Bank of England agreed to make £10 billion liquidity injection into the market.
The provision of emergency financing to Northern Rock did not have the expected effect of calming the situation and, indeed, appears to have made it worse. The Northern Rock case raises a number of questions about the use of the lender of last resort. First, should the fact that it was receiving assistance have been made public? Second, was the use of “constructive ambiguity” here helpful or actually “destructive” rather than “constructive”? Third, should the central bank have acted earlier to provide liquidity to Northern Rock and to the market in general?  
Northern Rock – the road to nationalisation
There is little doubt that the authorities had no idea the crisis was looming and were caught by surprise. While it is always the case that political considerations will arise in a banking crisis the political reaction and response to the problems at Northern Rock were as unexpected as the crisis itself. While always maintaining that a private sector solution was the preferred option the government, after loans amounting to at least £25bn had been made to Northern Rock and a guarantee of all deposits​[56]​, nationalized the bank in February 2008 after it proved impossible to arrange a private sector solution​[57]​. On the 17th February Alastair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced the nationalization of Northern Rock and immediately introduced appropriate legislation for this to be done​[58]​. He emphasised that Northern Rock would be in “temporary public ownership” and would continue to operate as a bank on a commercial basis​[59]​. He also stated that the guarantee arrangements which had been put in place in the Autumn of 2007 were to remain in place. On the 22nd February it was announced by the Treasury that all Northern Rock shares had been acquired, including preference shares​[60]​.  In the space of a few days from the Chancellor’s announcement Northern Rock had been nationalised.
The Special Liquidity Scheme in the UK
On the 21st of April 2008, approximately 8 months after the problems at Northern Rock became public and the panic ensued, the Bank of England announced the launch of a scheme, known as the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)​[61]​, to deal with the failure of the interbank markets to return to some state of normality. It was recognized by then that the normal conditions in this market were showing no signs of returning and, as a result, it had become necessary to find a way of injecting liquidity to the banks in the UK, on a temporary basis, while at the same time avoiding the dangers of an increase in moral hazard.  It was envisaged that this scheme would satisfy the requirements of ensuring that both the risks and financial costs would remain with the banks receiving financial assistance and not with the Bank of England or the Treasury. Subsequent developments resulting from the global financial crisis have meant that the SLS which when introduced was not intended to be a permanent scheme but one aimed at providing a temporary solution to the continuing  problems associated with the lack of liquidity in the financial markets had to be extended and expanded.  Eligibility to use the SLS for draw-downs ended on the 30th of January 2009 but the scheme will remain in place for another three years which, according to the Bank of England, provides ‘participating institutions with continuing liquidity support and certainty’​[62]​. 
The SLS is essentially a vehicle through which good-quality but illiquid assets held by banks in the UK could be ‘swapped’ for liquid government securities. It provides, in effect, a repo transaction. By the end of January 2009 Treasury Bills with a total face value of £185 billion had been lent to banks and building societies under the scheme​[63]​ with a total of 32 banks and building societies accessing the scheme.  At the time of the introduction of the SLS it was intended that it would close to new applications at the end of October 2008 are due to the conditions in the financial markets at that time it became necessary for it to be developed and expanded.  The original idea was for a return to normality to be achieved by providing a temporary swap of ‘high quality mortgage-backed and other securities’ for UK Treasury Bills​[64]​. It  was recognised that, at least for the short term, that there would be no market for trading some of these assets held by UK banks.
The SLS actually allows assets to be swapped for a relatively long period of time, and this indicates that the Bank of England and the Treasury feel that the interbank market is not likely to return to normal for a significant period. It works in the following way​[65]​. Initially a swap of assets was made for a fixed period of one year but it is possible that this may be renewed up to three years in total. An important feature of the original scheme was that only assets which were in existence at the end of 2007 were eligible for swapping. That was to ensure that banks did not use the SLS to finance new lending.  An important feature of the SLS is that the risk of losses remains with the individual banks.  The Bank of England does not intend taking on any of the risk and the design of the SLS, while not totally eliminating any risk to public funds, has certainly reduced it to an acceptable level.
If this process eventually proves to be successful it will result in increased liquidity for individual banks and indeed the banking system.  The governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has stated “the Bank of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme is designed to improve the liquidity position of the banking system and raise confidence in financial markets while ensuring that the risk of losses on loans they have made remains with the banks”​[66]​. 
The period for which initial swaps could be made ran  for six months from the 21st of April 2008. Each bank had, therefore, to decide how much of its assets, in existence at the end of 2007, should be swapped. So by the 20th of October 2008 the Bank of England and the Treasury were  in a position to know the extent of which the SLS has been used but by that time events had moved on, and as noted above, it was necessary to extend the life of the SLS and also to greatly increase the amounts of funds to be available.  Of course, what is not yet known is whether or not the banks receiving assistance will wish to continue beyond the initial period of 12 months but it appears increasingly likely that this will be the case. It is a significant feature of the SLS that although each swap will be for a period of one year the banks will be able to request a renewal for a further one year period and then at the end of that period to make a further request for another one year period.  Renewals will not be automatic however but will be subject to the discretion of the Bank of England.  So far no detailed guidance has been given as to what factors the Bank of England will take into account in exercising that discretion and that is something which needs to be clarified.  Presumably factors such as the overall liquidity position of the general market place will be taken into account but also the liquidity position of individual banks requesting the renewal will also be a relevant factor.
The SLS, despite its design, does not come without risks. This has been recognized in that the Bank of England has been indemnified by HM Treasury but to ensure that any risks are minimised banks will need to take what is described as a “haircut”.  This means that they receive Treasury bills with a lower nominal value than the assets they have provided in the swap. It has already been seen that the Bank of England requires that the illiquid assets that are being swapped be of “sufficiently high quality”​[67]​ and a list of the classes of eligible securities was set out in a Market Notice​[68]​. Importantly UK and EEA covered bonds (including own-name bonds) secured by mortgages (residential and commercial) are included. Most of the other classes are public sector issued securities from the UK, EEA and US, including debt securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, although there is some argument about the quality of these. An additional requirement is that an eligible security must be triple-A rated by at least two of the major credit rating agencies​[69]​. 
As mentioned above the SLS was due to close to new applications in October 2008 but the deepening international financial crisis led to an increased need for liquidity assistance. In fact by late September and early October the position of many UK banks, both in relation to capital and liquidity, was so bad that a major operation was required in an attempt to save several major banks from insolvency. So instead of announcing the termination of the temporary SLS after its initial six month period ended in October 2008 the Government, on 8th October 2008, announced a rescue plan which has had the effect inter alia of expanding and extending it​[70]​. 
This stabilisation plan announced by the Chancellor has three parts, one of which is concerned with liquidity. Although this article is concerned with lender of last resort issues it is important, for an understanding of the way in which the continuing SLS is to operate, to consider all aspects of the stabilisation plan.
The Chancellor announced that the government had established a Bank Recapitalisation Fund (BRF) to enable UK banks​[71]​ to increase their capital positions. Eight major UK banks immediately announced that they planned to join the scheme and increase their capital. Some of the new capital was to be raised in the open market, with the remainder being raised through the BRF. Where recapitalisation is to be made through the BRF this will be by way of an issue of preference shares by the relevant bank to the government and these are to rank in priority over ordinary shares of the bank. Attached to these preference shares will be a fixed rate of interest, which is set at the significantly, and punitively, high level of 12%.  This is aimed at protecting public funds thereby ensuring that the source of capital, while necessary in the short term, is sufficiently unattractive because of cost to ensure that those banks which have raised capital in this way will make every attempt to repay the government as soon as they are in a position to do so.  It is interesting to note that no other country which has introduced a similar scheme has set the interest rate at such a high level and there are legitimate concerns about whether this could actually make it more difficult for UK banks which are using the BRF to operate effectively. 
Since the introduction of the scheme three major UK banks have applied for capital through the BRF (Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)).  Barclays announced its intention to increase capital by £10 billion from private sources; Santander is transferring £1 billion to its UK operations; HSBC has already injected £750 million of new capital; Standard Chartered is adequately capitalised and does not need any injection; Nationwide Building Society, which is mutually owned, will increase its capital by £500 million.
HBOS, Lloyds TSB and RBS​[72]​   have also attempted, without success, to raise some capital from existing shareholders but all needed the government to take substantial shareholdings.  In the case of RBS the attempt to raise capital from existing shareholders was unsuccessful and the government has a majority stake in the bank​[73]​.  
The government has continually asserted that it has no intention of running UK banks but it does want to rebuild them.  The Chancellor has announced that it is the government’s intention to sell the public share in the participating banks as soon as this can be done. 
In addition to the recapitalisation the Chancellor significantly increased the amounts available to the Bank of England to lend through the SLS. He announced in the House of Commons that he had agreed further immediate liquidity measures with the Governor of the Bank of England​[74]​ and stated that “until markets stabilise, the Bank of England will extend and widen its injections of funds into the system”​[75]​. The amount available to the Bank of England to lend through the SLS was increased “to a total of at least £200 billion”​[76]​ thereby indicating at that time it was thought that the final amount needed may have been considerably more. As has been seen above the final figure came close at £185 billion. It was also announced that the Bank of England would lend in both sterling and US dollars against a wider range of collateral​[77]​ than had been the case under the original SLS. The Chancellor emphasised once again that this was designed to ensure that the risks of losses would be with the banks receiving assistance and not with the UK taxpayer. 
On the 13th October the Chancellor made a further statement on financial stability in the House of Commons​[78]​ in which he announced that with immediate effect the provision of liquidity would include an unlimited amount of dollar funds available to banks to be swapped for sterling funds and continued loan operations through the SLS​[79]​
The third part of the stabilisation programme is the temporary underwriting of eligible new debt issued by banks. The aim of this is to encourage banks to start lending to each other again and this, if successful, would also assist in increasing the amount of liquidity in the banking system. This would work in tandem with the SLS. The Chancellor has recognized that many banks have simply lost confidence in each other and that medium-term lending between them has frozen up.  He noted that if banks do not lend to each other they are also unlikely to lend in the normal marketplace to businesses and individuals.  To remove what is perceived to be a key barrier the government is offering to temporarily underwrite any new eligible debt issued by banks which participate in the BRF. This is to be priced on commercial terms and the expected amount available is to be in the region of £250 billion, but the Chancellor indicated that this sum is to be kept under review. The guarantee under the scheme will be provided directly by the Treasury and it will cover new lending issued during a six-month period. This period is to be renewable. The actual cost can be varied at the discretion of the Treasury but has initially been set at a premium of 50 basis points above the recent average cost of default insurance for each of the participating banks and accordingly is risk-based.  It is worth reiterating that it is only banks (and building societies) which participate in the BRF which are eligible for this assistance
On the 16th October 2008 the Bank of England published details of a permanent regime to underpin liquidity in the banking system​[80]​. The permanent regime is designed to ‘to improve the functioning of the existing framework and introduce two new permanent liquidity insurance facilities for banks to access in stressed financial circumstances’​[81]​.
The Bank of England’s existing Standing facilities are to be replaced with what are to be known as Operational Standing Facilities. The Standing facilities were introduced in 2006 and allowed banks to borrow unlimited amounts from the Bank of England at any time and also to deposit any surplus cash. The Bank of England believes that the existing facility ‘became stigmatised after August 2007 when operational use was misinterpreted as a sign of financial difficulty’​[82]​. To get rid of this stigma the Bank of England announced the replacement of the then existing Standing Facilities with Operational Standing Facilities and a Discount Window Facility. Importantly, the Bank has amended its approach to the disclosure of the use of these facilities. From 20 October 2008 average use of the Operational Standing Facilities will only be disclosed after the end of the relevant maintenance period.​[83]​  This, the Bank of England believes should cause the cessation of any potential stigma.   
The Discount Window Facility is to be a permanent feature which will allow banks to swap securities for either government securities or, in some cases, cash. According to the Bank of England “the facility is explicitly designed to help contain system stress by providing financing against assets that may become illiquid in stressed conditions”​[84]​. 
The  original  SLS provided important liquidity assistance for many of the banks which are currently experiencing  liquidity problems but what is as yet unclear is the position of banks which are denied assistance on the basis that the assets being offered are not considered by the Bank of England to be of sufficiently high quality. Were this to happen the bank being denied assistance would clearly have significant problems.  Both the application by the bank and the refusal by the Bank of England would not be in the public domain but it would quickly become clear to the market that the bank in question had been unable to obtain additional liquidity on the basis of a swap under the SLS. 
To coincide with the ending of the drawdown period of the SLS the Chancellor announced the creation of an Asset Purchase Facility (APF).  The Bank of England is to operate the scheme the objective of which “is to increase the availability of corporate credit, in order to support the Bank of England’s responsibilities and financial stability and monetary stability in the United Kingdom”​[85]​.  The Chancellor authorised the Bank of England to purchase up to £50 billion of what he describes as ‘high quality private sector assets’​[86]​. The Bank of England is to be indemnified by the government to ensure that it is protected in connection with any losses.
The APF will allow banks to sell a wide range of assets to the Bank of England which should assist in allowing banks to operate with greater liquidity​[87]​. The Governor of the Bank of England immediately announced that it would establish a new company to undertake these transactions and that it will provide a clear, transparent mechanism for monitoring the operations conducted under the facility​[88]​.  It will also publish a quarterly report on the transactions undertaken in the APF.​[89]​
Liquidity, lender of last resort and constructive ambiguity – where are we now?
In the consultation paper Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Further Consultation in July 2008​[90]​ it is recognised that “ through the provision of liquidity to the financial system the Bank of England plays a key role in contributing to maintaining financial stability and implementing monetary policy”​[91]​.  In addition it states that the government intends to introduce legislation (and has since introduced the Banking Act 2009) but what is contained in the document is minimalist in relation to policy on providing emergency liquidity assistance with little detail being provided and, importantly, it does not deal at all with the question of constructive ambiguity​[92]​. Also, despite legislative reforms in the Banking Act there is no sign as yet of any legislative developments in relation to the provision of liquidity. It is recognised that while at present the Bank of England’s responsibility for monetary policy is clearly set out in legislation​[93]​ this is not the case in relation to financial stability. This is to change and the Bank of England will be given “statutory responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of financial stability within the UK”​[94]​. This is to be a high level objective which will ensure that the central bank is given the flexibility it needs to attain its objective. No further details of how this will operate are provided.
The proposals relating to liquidity support arrangements deal with certain specific issues.  The first of these is a proposal to provide the Bank of England with “statutory immunity from liabilities and damages arising from acts or omissions in carrying out its responsibilities in relation to financial stability and other central bank functions”.​[95]​ The second proposal is to clarify the Bank of England’s position as a creditor​[96]​. The third proposal is to extend financial assistance to building societies and this has already been done​[97]​.  To strengthen the position of   the Bank of England further the government is to allow building societies to grant floating charges in relation to emergency liquidity financing​[98]​.
The question of liquidity disclosure was clearly an important issue in the Northern Rock case and the apparent ‘stigma’ of lender of last resort assistance surfaced. This subject is considered within the consultation and it is recognized that there are circumstances in which disclosure can have a damaging effect on the provision of liquidity assistance.  This is certainly not a new viewpoint.  In 1994 Sir Edward George, former Governor of the Bank of England, wrote “we usually try to keep the fact that we are providing systemic support secret at the time.... If people know that we are so concerned about systemic fragility that we have judged necessary to provide support, which could lead to a wider loss of confidence.  They would wonder how far that support would be extended, and we could rapidly find ourselves in the position where we were in practice underwriting all the liabilities of the banking system”.​[99]​ The former Governor was merely advocating that it is better to keep assistance confidential at the time when it is actually being provided. He was not arguing for secrecy and emphasise that it should be made public as soon as possible thereafter. This is generally recognized as a sensible approach. Under the system where the Bank of England lent to the discount houses no-one knew which bank of banks needed the funds.
Market transparency is undoubtedly of utmost importance and this is recognized by the UK authorities who also recognize that it is very difficult to strike the right balance between the transparency which is afforded by disclosure and the protection which is afforded by secrecy.​[100]​ To achieve a balanced response the consultation paper contains two specific proposals.  First, is the publication of the Bank of England’s weekly return​[101]​. It appears that most respondents to the January consultation supported this proposal.  While any decision has yet to be taken it seems likely that this will be done. Also of significance are the other statutory reporting requirements of the Bank of England which require disclosure of liquidity assistance operations.  For example, the Annual Report and Accounts do not contain details of specific liquidity assistance operations until there is no longer a need for confidentiality.​[102]​
The need for banks to be able to access liquidity without stigma is recognised as being particularly important​[103]​ and the proposals on disclosure should assist in this respect.
In October 2008 the Bank of England published a consultative paper on in the development of the Bank of England’s market operations​[104]​but this is concerned with normal market operations and not about lender of last resort to while it is helpful to see such developments no guidance about the operation of the lender of last resort role is given.
Another matter of some significance in relation to providing lender of last resort assistance, but which is not obviously directly related to it, is the Special Resolution Regime (SRR) which is contained in the Banking Act 2009​[105]​. The SRR proposals are contained in Part One of this Act. Section 1(1) provides that the purpose of the SRR for banks is to address the situation where all or part of the business of bank has encountered, or is likely to encounter, financial difficulties.  The interface between the provision of lender of last resort assistance and the Bank of England’s role in the SRR is of particular importance and potentially problematic. The Bank of England has responsibility for exercising a ‘stabilisation power’ where the FSA is satisfied that two conditions are met.  Condition one is that the bank is failing, or is likely to fail, to satisfy the threshold conditions (within the meaning of section 41 (1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and condition two is that having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances it is not reasonably likely that (ignoring the stabilisation powers) action will be taken by in respect of the bank that will enable the bank to satisfy the threshold conditions. Should the FSA consider that these two conditions are satisfied with respect to a bank it is required to consult with both the Bank of England and the Treasury.
If, on the basis of the consultation, the tripartite authorities are in agreement that the conditions have been met, the Bank of England has power to exercise a stabilisation power in respect of the bank.​[106]​ What exactly does that mean? The Bank of England has power to sell all or part of the business of the bank to a commercial purchaser​[107]​ in appropriate circumstances and this can be done without the need for a court order. In addition to the FSA’s finding of failing to meet a threshold condition, the Bank of England has to be satisfied that two further conditions are met. Condition A is that the exercise of the power is necessary, having regard to the public interest in the stability of the financial systems of the UK, the maintenance of public confidence in the stability of the banking systems of the UK or the protection of depositors​[108]​.  
Condition B is that the Treasury has made a recommendation that the Bank of England exercise a stabilisation power on the grounds that it is necessary to protect the public interest and, in the opinion of the Bank of England, exercise of the stabilisation power is an appropriate way to provide that protection. 
Section 5(1) provides that the Treasury is to issue a Code of Practice about the use of the stabilization powers and this is necessary to clarify some issues. For example under Condition B does the Treasury initiate the recommendation or does the Bank of England actually ask for this. This is not entirely clear and if it is to be the Treasury how would the information needed to arrive at such a conclusion be obtained. The Code of Practice will hopefully clarify the position. 
The concern with these provisions is that a bank which is considering approaching the Bank of England for lender of last resort assistance will be only too aware of the possible risks involved. Does a bank which needs temporary financial assistance fail to meet the threshold conditions?  If the FSA were to make such a determination that would lead to the Bank of England having to at least consider taking control of the bank and selling all or part of it to a private sector purchaser (or to a bridge bank).  It is not being suggested here that the Bank of England would act unreasonably but both parties, the financially troubled bank and the Bank of England, are put in a very difficult position.  The authors consider that the Bank of England should not have availed itself to be the authority in charge of two of the key stabilisation options in the new SRR. Dealing with troubled banks is by definition a ‘micro’ task, and a difficult one, with heavy legal consequences, not to mention the possible adverse reputational effect for an institution that is in charge of monetary policy.  While we commend the attribution of a macro-supervisory role to the Bank of England (a statutory mandate of financial stability) in line with its monetary policy responsibilities and LOLR/ELA functions, we are skeptical about the wisdom of conferring pre-insolvency powers to the Bank of England.  Little to win, lots to lose if things go wrong is what the Bank of England should expect from its SRR powers. 
The expanding role of the Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve Board has considerably expanded its lending facilities to banks, other financial market participants and even corporations over the last eighteen months​[109]​ The legislative authority invoked in many cases since March 2008 is Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act, which allows the Fed to lend to financial institutions other than a regulated depository institution because of “unusual and exigent circumstances”.  
Section 13. 3 (‘Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations’) reads as follows:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual, partnership, or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.​[110]​
To the traditional discount window lending (DWL) for depository institutions and open market operations (OMOs), a number of facilities and programs have been added, which are briefly described in chronological order in the ensuing paragraphs.​[111]​ This expanding list of facilities is characterized by the widening range of acceptable collateral, the lengthening of the term of the loan in particular in the case of TALF (Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility) and the prominent role played by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.​[112]​ 
As we have pointed already, the crisis began in August 2007. It is symptomatic of the speed with which the Federal Reserve has responded to the crisis through the use of the various instruments at its disposal (from monetary policy to DWL) that a week after BNP Paribas froze redemptions for three investment funds,​[113]​ the Term Discount Window Program was announced, on 17 August 2007, as a first line of defense available to depository institutions or DIs (this term is used in the US to refer to commercial banks and to what in the EU terminology are called credit institutions). In December 2007, the Term Auction Facility (TAF) was launched, permitting Federal Reserve Banks to auction term funds for depository institutions against a broader range of counterparties and broader range of collateral.  The Federal Open Market Committee also authorized in December 2007 temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank to improve global liquidity.

Until March 2008, Fed lending was restricted to depository institutions. The ‘qualitative jump’ of LOLR beyond depository institutions took place in the course of this month.  The legal basis was Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act. This was the first time since the 1930s that the Fed used this provision (the authority was invoked but no loans were made in the 1960s) to extend credit to financial institutions other than a regulated DI because of “unusual and exigent circumstances”. On 11 March 2008 the Federal Reserve Board announced an expansion of its securities lending program with the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), lending Treasury securities to primary dealers taking in exchange mortgage backed securities (MBS).​[114]​ On 14 March 2008, the rescue of Bear Stearns was arranged via a conduit loan made by the Fed to JPMorgan Chase, which in turned lent to Bear. Bear Stearns was too interconnected to be allowed to fail at a moment when markets were extremely fragile. Over the weekend (March 15-16), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York assisted in the takeover of Bear by JP Morgan Chase on 16 March 2008 (the initial price of 2$ per share was subsequently increased to $10).  

Over that weekend March 2008 the Fed also developed the primary dealer credit facility (PDFC), which opened on Monday, March 17, to provide primary dealers with access to a Federal Reserve credit facility, ‘when news about Bear rippled through the United States Financial markets. The PDFC was hardly used until Lehman Bros’ bankruptcy on September 15’​[115]​. Under the PDFC, the primary dealers pledged securities to borrow dollars. 

In June 2008 a special purpose vehicle or SPV (called ‘Maiden Lane I’) was created by the Fed to hold assets acquired to facilitate the merger of JP Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns.  According to Baxter, the ‘Marriage’ of 13.3 and SPV has allowed the Fed to be creative in its crisis management procedures. With proper Section 13.3 authorization, the Fed can create a limited liability company ad lend to it, in order to add liquidity or effect some other policy objective. 

It is worth recalling that the events in September 2008 had a catastrophic effect in what was already a bad financial situation.  The placing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under federal conservatorship pursuant to the Federal Housing Financing Agency Act on September 7, 2008, following by the demise of Lehman Brothers on September 15 and the announcement of the takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America dented further the already fragile confidence and prompted further action by the authorities.  

In September 2008 the Fed extended liquidity assistance to insurance companies (AIG) forming two SPVs to which it lent funds to help stabilize AIG. Then assistance was also offered to mutual funds.  In October 2008, the Fed opened the commercial paper funding facility, in which the SPV buys commercial paper using the proceeds of a Fed loan.  In November 2008 the Fed opened the Money Market Investors Funding Facility. On 25 November 2008, the Fed announced the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) with a longer duration than any previous facility, at least one year and available to all US Persons.  On 10 February 2009, as part of the new Financial Stability Plan, the Federal Reserve Board announced that TALF could be increased from the initial $200 Billion to as much as $1 trillion of fully secured loans, broadening the scope to include a further range of assets. The expansion is to be funded from additional funds from TARP. ​[116]​

According to  Thomas Baxter, the General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ‘the Federal Reserve will continue to do whatever it takes, within the bounds of the law, to deal with this financial crisis’.​[117]​   

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Lender of Last Resort as a central bank function has substantially changed over the last eighteen months, in response to the financial crisis.  The concept of constructive ambiguity has been altered.  It is clear that in times of extreme uncertainty and volatility, market participants want little ambiguity from their central bank. The SLS, in the UK, has not, at least not yet, become a permanent feature but it is possible at some time in the future that it may have to. If that were to happen there would be no place for ambiguity, constructive or otherwise, and providing the collateral  requirements are satisfied the role of the Bank of England would not be to decide whether or not to assist but simply to evaluate the quality of the security being offered and then to provide assistance. The bank would be hit by a ‘haircut’ and would have to pay for the privilege.
LOLR as a crisis management instrument has always been related to other crisis management procedures, notably deposit insurance and insolvency proceedings.  A major issue that must be considered following recent events is the role that insolvency should play, in view of the introduction of the SRR in the UK and the large number of state aid cases authorised by the Commission (at some point the exit strategy in some of those cases ought to be an orderly winding up via an insolvency proceeding). Under classic LOLR, as has already been seen, the central bank would only lend to banks which were illiquid but which were still solvent. In practice, of course, the speed with which an assessment of a bank’s financial position had to be made, meant that assistance was no doubt sometimes provided to banks which had crossed the threshold of insolvency.  In November 2007 the traditional position was reiterated by the Bank of England but that, of course, was before the introduction of the SLS, the SRR and the other measures that have taken place since then. Banks which had become insolvent have certainly been assisted in the UK since the troubles at Northern Rock but on the basis of having a capital injection as well as liquidity through the SLS. The UK government has shown a real reluctance to allow any high profile bank to fail​[118]​.   And the US has lost all appetite to allow any big institutions to fail following the chaos that ensued the demise of Lehman Brothers. Does this imply that where a bank is of sufficiently low profile and therefore systemically unimportant no attempt is likely to made by the Authorities to keep it afloat?  That is an issue which extends beyond the scope of this paper.  What is certainly clear following the events over the last eighteen months is that ensuring that depositors are fully protected remains sacrosanct.
The financial crisis has meant that the role of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve System and other central banks in providing lender of last resort assistance or emergency liquidity assistance is never likely to be the same again. While many countries have introduced clear legal frameworks for the provision of liquidity it does not appear that the UK is going to adopt this approach, in particular since the recently adopted Banking Act 2009 does not go into details in this regard. However, as suggested previously, it is quite likely that the SRR may prove to have a significant impact on the future of the lender of last resort role.
The effect of the introduction of the SRR probably means that a bank approaching the Bank of England for LOLR assistance will risk the possibility of finding itself subject to this procedure.  Is this likely to be a factor in reality?  If so, what affect might it have on behaviour of bank management? The Treasury is to publish a Code of Practice in relation to the use of the SRR and that might assist in clarifying the position. Some guidance from the Bank of England on how it sees its lender of last resort role would be very welcome. 
Reputation and confidence are and were at the core of what LOLR/ELA operations aim to achieve. In this sense, the revision of the traditional principles ought to mitigate the issues of ‘stigma’ (resulting from a perception that only the desperate go to the LOLR/ELA) that were evident in the Northern Rock case.  Disclosure is generally a good thing, but given the psychological component in the rapid spread of a crisis, the provision of covert as opposed to over assistance should remain in the arsenal of the central bank. The importance of a clear mandate and a set of enabling rules for the central bank with regard to financial stability, in particular with regard to its LOLR/ELA operations contributes positively to the safeguard of confidence and has a positive reputational effect.  The imaginative use of central bank powers, such as the clever interpretation of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, to inject liquidity to a wider range of institutions and markets in response to the evolving and expanding crisis.  The literature on systemic risk and contagion ought to be rewritten. When confidence is fragile, the perception that a financial institution (not just a commercial bank) is in trouble, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Central banks and public authorities can claim that if they are to assist an institution in “a rainy day” they should regulate that institution in “a sunny day.” Hence, regulation and protection tend to be mutually reinforcing.  The downside of “protection” is moral hazard.   In the absence of protection, individuals and institutions tend to be more conservative and less risk prone. Public opinion is usually sympathetic towards regulation in the aftermath of crises.  And the longer a crisis lasts and the more severe its effects are, the greater the public sympathy for regulation. “At the end of the tunnel of a financial crisis lies not light, but the gloom of recession. As surely as smoke follows fire, what comes after a financial meltdown is an economic downturn”​[119]​.   
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^117	  T. Baxter, above note 109. 
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^119	  Aditya Chakraborty, The Guardian, 15 October 2008).
^120	  Ben Bernanke, London School of Economics Presentation, January 2009.
